CCISD conduct consul

Defenders of the pipeline cannot attribute the explosion of school-based arrests to an increase in school violence. On the contrary, empirical evidence shows that between 1992 and 2002, school violence actually dropped by about half.(2)o Rather than nurturing and educating children perceived to pose a disciplinary problem, schools are turning to law enforcement to simply get rid of the child.* Unfortunately, children of color and children with disabilities bear the brunt of these harsh trends.

Monday, August 13, 2007

School funds are held to be trust funds for educational purposes. Such funds do not belong to the district or to the officers of the district,........

Actuary "Ezekial 25:17 - The path of the righteous man is beset on all sides by the inequites of the selfish and the tyranny of evil men. Blessed is he that shepherds the weak from the valley of darkness for he is truly his brother's keeper, and the finder of lost children. And I will strike down upon thee with great vengeance and furious anger those who attempt to poison and destroy my brothers, and you will know my name is the Lord when I lay my vengeance upon thee.

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

No. 02-0427

West Orange-Cove Consolidated I.S.D.

et al., Petitioners

v.

Felipe Alanis, in his official capacity as

the Commissioner of Education, et al., Respondents

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas

Argued March 27, 2003

Justice Hecht delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Phillips, Justice Owen, Justice O'Neill, Justice Jefferson, Justice Schneider, and Justice Wainwright joined.

Justice Enoch filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Smith filed a dissenting opinion.

Article VIII, section 1-e of the Texas Constitution states: "No State ad valorem taxes shall be levied upon any property within this State." (1) We have held that "[a]n ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed directly by the State or when the State so completely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either directly or indirectly, that the [taxing] authority employed is without meaningful discretion." (2)

The maintenance and operation of Texas public schools are funded mostly by ad valorem taxes levied by local school districts under comprehensive state regulation that, among other things, caps the rates at which districts can tax and redistributes local revenue among districts. In 1995, we held that the State's control of this school funding system had not made local property taxes an unconstitutional state tax because school districts retained meaningful discretion in generating revenue, but we foresaw a day when increasing costs of education and evolving circumstances might force local taxation at maximum rates. (3) At that point, we said, the conclusion that a state property tax had been levied would be "unavoidable". (4)

In the case before us, four plaintiff school districts allege that that day has come. Specifically, they contend that they and other districts have been forced to tax at maximum rates set by statute in order to educate their students. These taxes, they say, have become indistinguishable from a state ad valorem tax prohibited by article VIII, section 1-e.

The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, holding that a constitutional violation could not be alleged because far fewer than half of Texas' 1,035 school districts were taxing at the maximum rates allowed. The court of appeals affirmed, focusing not on how many districts were taxing at maximum rates but on whether any of them were forced to do so just to provide an accredited education as defined by statute. (5) We disagree with both courts and therefore reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

I

This is the fifth in a series of cases to come before us challenging the constitutionality of the Texas public school finance system on various grounds. (6) Central to some of the cases and basic to them all is article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution, which states:

A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools. (7)

By assigning to the Legislature a duty, this section both empowers and obligates. It gives to the Legislature the sole authority to set the policies and fashion the means for providing a public school system. (8) Thus we have said that "[w]e do not prescribe the means which the Legislature must employ in fulfilling its duty." (9) But the provision also requires the Legislature to meet three standards. First, the education provided must be adequate; that is, the public school system must accomplish that "general diffusion of knowledge . . . essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people". Second, the means adopted must be "suitable". Third, the system itself must be "efficient". "[T]hese are admittedly not precise terms," as we have acknowledged, but "they do provide a standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the constitutionality of the legislature's actions." (10) The final authority to determine adherence to the Constitution resides with the Judiciary. (11) Thus, the Legislature has the sole right to decide how to meet the standards set by the people in article VII, section 1, and the Judiciary has the final authority to determine whether they have been met. (12)

In 1989, we decided Edgewood I, the first case challenging the constitutionality of the public school finance system under article VII, section 1. The system's principal component for funding maintenance and operations was the Foundation School Program, a two-tiered mechanism that the Legislature had set up in 1975. (13) The first tier was designed to fund a basic education. (14) Every school district that could not, by taxing at a specified minimum rate, generate a certain level of revenue per student in "weighted average daily attendance" ("WADA" -- weighted by taking into account special needs and conditions such as special or bilingual education) was given state funds to make up the difference. (15) Despite its stated purpose, first-tier funding did not cover the cost of meeting bare educational requirements mandated by the Legislature. (16) The system's second tier provided state funds to guarantee a certain level of additional revenue per student in WADA for each penny a school district increased its tax rate above the prescribed minimum. (17) School district tax rates were capped at $1.50 per $100 property valuation (18) as they had been for decades. (19) Smaller components of the school finance system were the Available School Fund established by the Constitution, (20) which provided all school districts about $300 per student, (21) and federal funding. (22) Facilities and other expenses were funded separately. (23)

Then, as now, local ad valorem taxes supplied more than half the funding for public schools, (24) the tax bases of the more than 1,000 school districts, and consequently the tax revenue available to them, were vastly different, (25) and state tax revenues were inadequate to level local funding disparities. (26) At that time, local tax revenues were not redistributed among school districts as they are now. We described the situation thus:

There are glaring disparities in the abilities of the various school districts to raise revenues from property taxes because taxable property wealth varies greatly from district to district. The wealthiest district has over $14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the poorest has approximately $20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio. The 300,000 students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's property wealth to support their education while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools have over 25% of the state's property wealth; thus the 300,000 students in the wealthiest districts have more than eight times the property value to support their education as the 300,000 students in the poorest districts. The average property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is more than twenty times greater than the average property wealth in the 100 poorest districts. . . .

* * *

Because of the disparities in district property wealth, spending per student varies widely, ranging from $2,112 to $19,333. Under the existing system, an average of $2,000 more per year is spent on each of the 150,000 students in the wealthiest districts than is spent on the 150,000 students in the poorest districts.

The lower expenditures in the property-poor districts are not the result of lack of tax effort. Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the property-poor districts must tax high merely to spend low. In 1985-86, local tax rates ranged from $.09 to $1.55 per $100 valuation. The 100 poorest districts had an average tax rate of 74.5 cents and spent an average of $2,978 per student. The 100 wealthiest districts had an average tax rate of 47 cents and spent an average of $7,233 per student. . . . A person owning an $80,000 home with no homestead exemption would pay $1,206 in taxes in the east Texas low-wealth district of Leveretts Chapel, but would pay only $59 in the west Texas high-wealth district of Iraan-Sheffield. Many districts have become tax havens. (27)

The plaintiffs in Edgewood I asserted that this public school finance system was not efficient within the meaning of article VII, section 1. "'Efficient,'" we said, "conveys the meaning of effective or productive of results and connotes the use of resources so as to produce results with little waste; this meaning does not appear to have changed over time." (28) Given these circumstances, a unanimous Court had little difficulty concluding that the constitutional standard of efficiency had not been met:

We hold that the state's school financing system is neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a "general diffusion of knowledge" statewide, and therefore that it violates article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Efficiency does not require a per capita distribution, but it also does not allow concentrations of resources in property-rich school districts that are taxing low when property-poor districts that are taxing high cannot generate sufficient revenues to meet even minimum standards. There must be a direct and close correlation between a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to it; in other words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort. Children who live in poor districts and children who live in rich districts must be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to educational funds. Certainly, this much is required if the state is to educate its populace efficiently and provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide. (29)

Because constitutional efficiency does not require absolute equality of spending, we expressly acknowledged that "local communities would [not] be precluded from supplementing an efficient system established by the legislature", but we added that "any local enrichment must derive solely from local tax effort." (30) In other words, the constitutional standard of efficiency requires substantially equivalent access to revenue only up to a point, after which a local community can elect higher taxes to "supplement" and "enrich" its own schools. That point, of course, although we did not expressly say so in Edgewood I, is the achievement of an adequate school system as required by the Constitution. Once the Legislature has discharged its duty to provide an adequate school system for the State, a local district is free to provide enhanced public education opportunities if its residents vote to tax themselves at higher levels. The requirement of efficiency does not preclude local supplementation of schools. Although we were not called upon in Edgewood I to consider what constitutional adequacy entails, the interrelationship between the standards of adequacy and efficiency was fundamental to our reasoning in that case.

We ordered that state funding of public schools cease on May 1, 1990, unless the Legislature conformed the system to meet constitutional standards. (31) Although we expressly did not "instruct the legislature as to the specifics of the legislation it should enact . . . or order it to raise taxes," (32) we cautioned that "[a] band-aid will not suffice; the system itself must be changed." (33) Eight months later, in a sixth special session, the Legislature adjusted the system to provide incentives it believed would "achieve substantial equity among the districts that educate 95% of our students." (34) The plaintiffs in Edgewood I immediately challenged this legislation, Senate Bill 1, again on the ground that the system was not efficient within the meaning of article VII, section 1 of the Constitution. Without attempting to determine whether the incentives added by Senate Bill 1 could realistically reach their goals, we concluded in Edgewood II that the system as a whole remained constitutionally inefficient:

Even if the approach of Senate Bill 1 produces a more equitable utilization of state educational dollars, it does not remedy the major causes of the wide opportunity gaps between rich and poor districts. It does not change the boundaries of any of the current 1052 school districts, the wealthiest of which continues to draw funds from a tax base roughly 450 times greater per weighted pupil than the poorest district. It does not change the basic funding allocation, with approximately half of all education funds coming from local property taxes rather than state revenue. And it makes no attempt to equalize access to funds among all districts. By limiting the funding formula to districts in which 95% of the students attend school, the Legislature excluded 132 districts which educate approximately 170,000 students and harbor about 15% of the property wealth in the state. A third of our students attend school in the poorest districts which also have about 15% of the property wealth in the state. Consequently, after Senate Bill 1, the 170,000 students in the wealthiest districts are still supported by local revenues drawn from the same tax base as the 1,000,000 students in the poorest districts.

These factors compel the conclusion as a matter of law that the State has made an unconstitutionally inefficient use of its resources. The fundamental flaw of Senate Bill 1 lies not in any particular provisions but in its overall failure to restructure the system. (35)

We reaffirmed that efficiency did not preclude local supplementation of school funding. (36) On rehearing, we stressed:

The current system remains unconstitutional not because any unequalized local supplementation is employed, but because the State relies so heavily on unequalized local funding in attempting to discharge its duty to "make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools." Once the Legislature provides an efficient system in compliance with article VII, section 1, it may, so long as efficiency is maintained, authorize local school districts to supplement their educational resources if local property owners approve an additional local property tax. (37)

Because the Legislature was then in session, we required that it respond without delay, and it promptly enacted Senate Bill 351. (38) The legislation created 188 new "county education districts". In most instances, a CED comprised the school districts in a single county. (39) The sole purpose of the CEDs was to levy, collect, and distribute property taxes among their component school districts, respectively, in effect consolidating school districts' tax bases while leaving them in control of their own schools. (40) CED tax rates and distributions were prescribed by statute to ensure uniformity. This state-controlled tax-base consolidation "reduced the geographical disparities in the availability of revenue for education" (41) and was not challenged as failing to satisfy the efficiency standard of article VII, section 1. It was, however, challenged as imposing a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e of the Constitution. We sustained that challenge in Edgewood III:

Senate Bill 351 mandates the tax CEDs levy. No CED may decline to levy the tax. The tax rate for all CEDs is predetermined by Senate Bill 351. No CED can tax at a higher rate or a lower rate under any circumstances. Indeed, the very purpose of the CEDs is to levy a uniform tax statewide. The distribution of the proceeds is set by Senate Bill 351. No CED has any discretion to distribute tax proceeds in any manner except as required by statute. Every function of the CEDs is purely ministerial. If the State mandates that a tax be levied, sets the rate, and prescribes the distribution of the proceeds, the tax is a state tax, regardless of the instrumentality which the State may choose to use. (42)

To place the situation created by Senate Bill 351 in the broader context of the constitutional prohibition of state ad valorem tax, we explained:

An ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed directly by the State or when the State so completely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either directly or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful discretion. How far the State can go toward encouraging a local taxing authority to levy an ad valorem tax before the tax becomes a state tax is difficult to delineate. Clearly, if the State merely authorized a tax but left the decision whether to levy it entirely up to local authorities, to be approved by the voters if necessary, then the tax would not be a state tax. The local authority could freely choose whether to levy the tax or not. To the other extreme, if the State mandates the levy of a tax at a set rate and prescribes the distribution of the proceeds, the tax is a state tax, irrespective of whether the State acts in its own behalf or through an intermediary. Between these two extremes lies a spectrum of other possibilities. If the State required local authorities to levy an ad valorem tax but allowed them discretion on setting the rate and disbursing the proceeds, the State's conduct might not violate article VIII, section 1-e. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define for every conceivable hypothetical precisely where along this continuum such taxes become state taxes. Therefore, if the Legislature, in an effort to remedy Senate Bill 351 with as few changes as possible, chose to inject some additional element of leeway in the assessment of the CED tax, it is impossible to say in advance whether that element would remove the tax from the prohibition of article VIII, section 1-e. Each case must necessarily turn on its own particulars. Although parsing the differences may be likened to dancing on the head of a pin, it is the Legislature which has created the pin, summoned the dancers, and called the tune. The Legislature can avoid these constitutional conundra by choosing another path altogether. (43)

We also held that by levying a tax without an election, the CEDs violated article VII, section 3(e) of the Constitution. (44)

We delayed enforcement of our ruling for more than a year, until the end of the next regular session of the Legislature in 1993. (45) During that session, the Legislature's first reaction was to attempt to amend the Constitution. A proposed amendment that would have rewritten article VII, section 1 to remove its standards and commit the responsibility for public education to local school districts was introduced but not reported out of committee. (46) A proposed amendment that would have authorized the system structured by Senate Bill 351 passed the Senate and narrowly passed the House (47) but was soundly defeated by the people before the session ended. (48) The Legislature then enacted Senate Bill 7. (49)

Senate Bill 7 returned to the two-tiered Foundation School Program, (50) the basic structure of which remains in place today. (51) As before, "[t]he stated purpose of Tier 1 is to guarantee 'sufficient financing for all school districts to provide a basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards.'" (52) At a minimum $0.86 tax rate, a school district that cannot generate revenue equal to a "basic allotment" per student in WADA -- in 1993, $2,300, (53) and today, $2,537, (54) subject to various adjustments (55) -- receives state funds for the difference. (56) As before, the basic allotment does not cover the cost of an education that meets legislated accrediting standards. (57) Tier 2 provides for partially state-supported local supplementation. (58) For each penny a district raises the tax rate above the minimum, the state guarantees a certain yield per weighted student -- $20.55 in 1993, (59) and $27.14 today. (60) The tax rate for maintenance and operations continues to be capped at $1.50, subject to various adjustments and exceptions. (61) There is also some state funding for facilities, sometimes referred to as Tier 3 in the system. (62)

The major change that Senate Bill 7 made in the Foundation School Program was to equalize school districts' "wealth per student" -- a district's taxable property value divided by the number of students in WADA. (63) A school district with wealth per student greater than a certain amount -- $280,000 in 1993, (64) and $305,000 today (65) -- must transfer the excess, or the tax revenue generated from it, either actually or effectively, so as to provide funding for school districts with less wealth. (66) The local tax revenue "recaptured" and redistributed by this mechanism amounted to almost $1 billion in 2000. (67) This taxable wealth equalization scheme, dubbed by some "Robin Hood", eliminates the geographical disparities in available revenue among school districts that characterized the pre-1993 version of the Foundation School Program.

The public school finance system set up by Senate Bill 7 was challenged on numerous grounds, all of which we rejected in Edgewood IV. Two are important for purposes of the present case. We held that the unequalized funding available for local supplementation did not render the system constitutionally inefficient:

It is apparent from the Court's opinions that we have recognized that an efficient system does not require equality of access to revenue at all levels. Otherwise, unequalized local supplementation, which we expressly approved in Edgewood II, could never be justified. Article VII, section 1 of the Constitution and our previous Edgewood decisions mandate that efficiency be measured against both qualitative and financial standards.

The district court viewed efficiency as synonymous with equity, meaning that districts must have substantially equal revenue for substantially equal tax effort at all levels of funding. This interpretation ignores our holding in Edgewood II that unequalized local supplementation is not constitutionally prohibited. The effect of this "equity at all levels" theory of efficiency is to "level-down" the quality of our public school system, a consequence which is universally regarded as undesirable from an educational perspective. Under this theory, it would be constitutional for the Legislature to limit all districts to a funding level of $500 per student as long as there was equal access to this $500 per student, even if $3500 per student were required for a general diffusion of knowledge. Neither the Constitution nor our previous Edgewood decisions warrant such an interpretation. (68)

Constitutional efficiency under article VII, section 1 requires only that "districts must have substantially equal access to funding up to the legislatively defined level that achieves the constitutional mandate of a general diffusion of knowledge." (69) That legislatively defined level was an accredited education:

In Senate Bill 7, the Legislature equates the provision of a "general diffusion of knowledge" with the provision of an accredited education. The accountability regime set forth in [the statute], we conclude, meets the Legislature's constitutional obligation to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide. (70)

We cautioned, however, that the Constitution does not give the Legislature a completely free hand in determining what level of education will achieve the general diffusion of knowledge required by article VII, section 1:

As long as the Legislature establishes a suitable regime that provides for a general diffusion of knowledge, the Legislature may decide whether the regime should be administered by a state agency, by the districts themselves, or by any other means.

This is not to say that the Legislature may define what constitutes a general diffusion of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to make suitable provision imposed by article VII, section 1. While the Legislature certainly has broad discretion to make the myriad policy decisions concerning education, that discretion is not without bounds. (71)

The interrelated constitutional standards of efficiency and adequacy both limit legislative discretion:

As long as efficiency is maintained, it is not unconstitutional for districts to supplement their programs with local funds, even if such funds are unmatched by state dollars and even if such funds are not subject to statewide recapture. We caution, however, that the amount of "supplementation" in the system cannot become so great that it, in effect, destroys the efficiency of the entire system. The danger is that what the Legislature today considers to be "supplementation" may tomorrow become necessary to satisfy the constitutional mandate for a general diffusion of knowledge. (72)

"This is simply another way of saying that the State's provision for a general diffusion of knowledge must reflect changing times, needs, and public expectations." (73)

In Edgewood IV, we also held that Senate Bill 7 did not impose a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e of the Constitution simply because a number of school districts were already taxing at the maximum $1.50 rate. Some districts were taxing below the minimum $0.86 rate, and it appeared that for the most part "[p]roperty-poor and property-rich districts presently can attain the revenue necessary to provide suitably for a general diffusion of knowledge at tax rates of approximately $1.31 and $1.22, respectively." (74) We acknowledged, however, that over time more districts would be required to tax at the maximum $1.50 rate:

if the cost of providing for a general diffusion of knowledge continues to rise, as it surely will, the minimum rate at which a district must tax will also rise. Eventually, some districts may be forced to tax at the maximum allowable rate just to provide a general diffusion of knowledge. If a cap on tax rates were to become in effect a floor as well as a ceiling, the conclusion that the Legislature had set a statewide ad valorem tax would appear to be unavoidable because the districts would then have lost all meaningful discretion in setting the tax rate. (75)

Although we rejected all of the challenges to Senate Bill 7, we stressed that the system was "minimally acceptable only when viewed through the prism of history." (76) In other words, it was better than it had been. But we added: "Surely Texas can and must do better." (77) In every session since 1993, the Legislature has amended the Education Code, (78) but little change has been made in funding the maintenance and operation of public schools. As noted, the Tier 1 basic allotments, the Tier 2 guaranteed yields, and the equalization threshold have all been increased, thereby providing more state funds for public education, but the structure of the system remains essentially the same. Meanwhile, the level of state funding has continued to fall, reliance on local property taxes has increased, (79) and more school districts -- now 39% with 32% of the State's 4.1 million students, according to petitioners' calculations from data furnished by the Texas Comptroller -- have reached maximum tax rates.

Presciently, we observed in Edgewood IV: "Our judgment in this case should not be interpreted as a signal that the school finance crisis in Texas has ended." (80)

II

In the case now before us, filed in April 2001, four school districts (81) assert that the public school finance system has come to involve a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e, just as we foresaw it might in Edgewood IV. (82) Specifically, after quoting our admonition from Edgewood IV, the plaintiffs alleged:

In the six years since the 1995 Edgewood IV decision, education costs have continued to rise. As predicted in Edgewood IV, school districts, such as the Plaintiffs, are required to tax at or near the maximum allowable $1.50 M&O [maintenance and operation] tax rate in order to educate students in their districts. Such school districts have lost all meaningful discretion in setting their M&O tax rate. Accordingly, as contemplated by the Supreme Court in Edgewood IV, the statutory cap on the M&O tax rate has become a statewide ad valorem tax in violation of the Texas Constitution. Without relief from the statutory cap on M&O tax rates, the Plaintiff school districts must continue to take such measures as cutting programs, eliminating teaching positions and/or increasing class size.

(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment declaring the $1.50 statutory cap to be a constitutionally prohibited state ad valorem tax.

The defendants (83) (collectively, "the State") answered with a plea to the jurisdiction, plea in abatement, and special exceptions, asserting that the action was not ripe and should be dismissed. Specifically, the State asserted:

• "the system would not result in a statewide ad valorem tax unless and until the 'cap on tax rates were to become in effect a floor as well as a ceiling' [quoting Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 738] as to all districts" (emphasis added), and plaintiffs do not and cannot allege that this is the situation;

• "Plaintiffs do not allege that the system requires them or any other district to tax at the rate of $1.50 in order to provide a general diffusion of knowledge" (emphasis in original) as they must to allege a constitutional violation, "but instead allege only that they must tax at (or near) $1.50 'in order to educate students in their districts"; and

• because "each of the Plaintiff districts . . . has voluntarily elected to grant an optional twenty percent homestead exemption . . . they cannot plead or prove that the State system forces them to tax at $1.50 just to provide an accredited education."

The State's ripeness and pleading arguments were thus related: in the State's view, the claims the plaintiffs were required to plead in order to state the constitutional violation they asserted were not ripe.

In response, the plaintiffs argued that:

• to show a state property tax they were required to prove only that some, not all, school districts were forced to tax at maximum rates;

• although the defendants contended that an accredited education could be provided for $4,179 per student, plaintiffs were entitled to explore the factual basis for that figure and to show that taxation at maximum rates was required to provide an accredited education; and

• homestead exemptions should not be taken into account in determining whether school districts were being forced to tax at maximum rates.

The plaintiffs contended that their pleadings were sufficient and stated claims that were ripe.

Two groups of school districts intervened. While they opposed the plaintiffs' claims, they alleged that the public school finance system remained flawed for other reasons. The six Edgewood intervenors (84) asserted:

The Edgewood Intervenors are Defendant Intervenors to the extent that they agree that this case should be dismissed for lack of ripeness and, therefore, lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On the other hand, Edgewood Intervenors are Cross-Plaintiff Intervenors to the extent that they agree that the Texas School Finance System at $1.50 does not provide sufficient funding or equitable funding to guarantee a general diffusion of knowledge.

The thirty-four Alvarado intervenors (85) asserted: "In spite of the fact that progress is being made, Intervenors do not concede that the funding levels for Tier 2 districts set by the legislature achieves an adequate level of funding for public schools in Texas." They added that "the state is not contributing its fair share of monies needed to maintain an adequate school finance system." Regarding the plaintiffs' claims, they agreed with the defendants that they should be dismissed:

Intervenors view Plaintiffs' case as a pure adequacy claim. As stated above, the $1.50 tax rate cap never becomes a factor unless total revenues available to school districts are inadequate to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge. Intervenors believe that the maintenance of an equitable system is the best way to insure adequacy.

The Alvarado intervenors specially excepted to the plaintiffs' pleading for alleging only that they were required to tax at maximum rates "to educate their students" rather than "to provide the constitutionally-required general diffusion of knowledge to their students." The plaintiffs responded:

This special exception mischaracterizes Plaintiffs' pleading and constitutes unnecessary hairsplitting over semantics. [Plaintiffs quoted from Edgewood IV and] then made clear that their cause of action was based on the [quoted] language, and that they are required to tax "at or near the $1.50 M&O tax rate in order to educate students in their districts", i.e., to provide a general diffusion of knowledge. Because the "floor" described by the Court [in Edgewood IV] is linked to the "general diffusion of knowledge" standard, Plaintiffs were implicitly (if not explicitly) alleging that they had to tax at or near $1.50 just to provide their students with a general diffusion of knowledge.

Ten weeks after the case was filed, the trial court conducted a hearing on the dilatory pleas and the special exceptions. The defendants argued, and the trial court agreed, that this Court's admonition in Edgewood IV that the finance system could result in a state property tax was dicta. (86) The plaintiffs argued, however, that this Court had described circumstances that could violate the constitutional prohibition of a state ad valorem tax, and that they were entitled to prove that those circumstances had come into existence. Regarding the plaintiffs' pleadings, the following colloquy occurred:

THE COURT: Well, let me ask counsel for the plaintiffs: are you . . . pleading that . . . you can't provide an accredited system on $1.50 or are you pleading that the accredited system isn't good enough to provide a general diffusion of knowledge and you can't provide a general diffusion of knowledge on $1.50?

COUNSEL: All of the above. All the above. . . . And again, we're involved in notice pleading. We pled it. It's pretty clear what we're driving at. We're driving at page 738 of the Edgewood [IV] majority opinion.

The trial court did not hear evidence but did take judicial notice of state appropriations and school district tax levies.

Less than a month later, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case. The court explained in the order:

Whether the Legislature has imposed a state ad valorem tax is decided by reference to how the public school finance system works throughout the state, not by reference to how the system works in any one district. Moreover, to look at the question district by district would mean that the tax could be constitutional in one district and unconstitutional in another. Thus, the court must assess the system as a whole.

* * *

Remember that the constitutional question is not how many districts are at the cap, but how many districts must be at the cap to provide an accredited education. The court today is merely holding that a plaintiff must be able to plead that some significant number of districts are at the cap to go forward with a claim that too many districts must be at the cap. Naturally, the court has assumed on special exceptions that if a district is at the cap, the district must be at the cap. This pleading assumption builds in a significant margin of error in favor of the plaintiff districts.

The margin of error is in favor of the plaintiff districts because, on the merits, the plaintiffs must show that the highly-acclaimed school districts taxing at $1.50 would plummet to academically-unacceptable school districts at $1.49.

* * *

Though Edgewood IV provides limited guidance on how many districts must have to tax at the cap to be constitutionally significant, or, in other words, for the court to conclude that the districts have lost "meaningful discretion" in levying the ad valorem tax, based upon what the Supreme Court does teach, this court holds that for the approved tax to become a prohibited state ad valorem tax, some significant number of districts across the state must have to tax at the $1.50 cap in order to provide an accredited education. For the legislative design to be an unconstitutional state ad valorem tax, the design must require a significant number of districts to tax at the cap, something approaching or exceeding half the districts.

Thus, a single number decides the case on special exceptions -- the percentage of districts that are at the cap of $1.50. The plaintiffs do not and cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted because a constitutionally insignificant number of districts are at the cap of $1.50. Only 19% of the school districts even tax at the cap of $1.50, which means that 81% do not. Indeed, two of the plaintiff districts do not tax at the $1.50 rate. Moreover, many districts, including all four plaintiffs, have granted local-option tax exemptions. Only 12% of the school districts tax at the cap of $1.50 without a local-option exemption, which means that 88% do not.

Of course, the decision to grant a local-option exemption in and of itself is the exercise of meaningful local discretion. By granting a local-option exemption, for whatever worthy reason, a school district takes a great amount of taxable wealth out of the system. . . . The court is not implying that these exemptions are not appropriate; the court is merely saying that they have the same effect as substantially lowering the tax rate. As long as a district has an exemption, therefore, it is not at the tax cap.

The court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' allegation of an existing violation of article VIII, section 1-e, and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs' allegation that a violation was imminent.

The court of appeals affirmed, (87) but not for the reasons given by the trial court. Although the court of appeals considered the pleading and ripeness issues separately, it recognized that the parties' arguments on both issues are related. In the court of appeals' view, the number of school districts taxing at maximum rates was irrelevant. "Whether the effect of the tax is experienced 'statewide' or by a majority of districts in the state does not determine whether a tax is a state tax." (88) Rather, the court said, "the controlling factor in reviewing a challenge to an alleged ad valorem tax is the State's involvement in the levy." (89) "Seen in this light," the court said, "the positions taken by the district court . . . and by the parties in their briefs, are based on a misunderstanding of the determinative factors of a state ad valorem tax." (90)

Regarding the plaintiffs' pleadings, the court explained:

In determining the State's control over the maintenance and operations property tax, the relevant inquiry is the relationship between the tax and the districts' obligations to provide an accredited education. As the court found in Edgewood IV, the system may encourage districts to tax at or near the maximum rate. Whether it does so is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether the system imposes a state tax. But if the districts' abilities to fulfill a state mandate, here the obligation to provide the minimum accredited education, forced the districts to tax at the maximum rate, the system might approach an unacceptable level of state control over the levy. Therefore, the allegation that a district is forced to tax at the highest allowable rate to provide the bare, accredited education is a necessary element of a cause of action brought by a district challenging the cap. (91)

The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to make this allegation:

West Orange-Cove instead pleaded that it was forced to tax at or near $1.50 to "educate its students." The enriched education that West Orange Cove locally desires to provide its students is not the measure for determining if the State is imposing an educational mandate that requires the local district to levy a state-imposed rate of tax. West Orange-Cove's pleadings simply fail to state a viable cause of action. (92)

Because the plaintiffs'

allegation does not refer to the districts' state-imposed obligation to provide an accredited education . . . , the districts' pleadings fail to state a challenge to the tax as a state tax. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the claim for failure to state a cause of action. (93)

The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim that taxation at maximum rates was necessary to achieve the constitutional standard of "a general diffusion of knowledge" was nonjusticiable:

As the record makes clear, West Orange-Cove wants to use this opportunity, framed as a tax challenge, to engage the judiciary in a debate over policy choices that are within the province of the legislative branch. Both the Legislature and the supreme court have equated the term "general diffusion of knowledge" with accreditation standards. The court, in addition, has insisted that the judiciary has a limited role in the area of educational policy and should defer to the Legislature on matters involving educational standards and funding . . . [citing Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726]. West Orange-Cove's claim would involve the courts in deciding what is meant by the term "general diffusion of knowledge" without reference to the accreditation standards set by the Legislature. That body, however, has conclusively equated the two concepts, thereby foreclosing the judicial inquiry West Orange-Cove seeks to pursue. Moreover, as the supreme court has recognized, the meaning of a "general diffusion of knowledge" and the development of appropriate accreditation standards are policy choices best suited to the legislature. Id. (94)

Summarizing its holdings, the court of appeals stated:

The instant case is not unripe because fewer than half of all school districts are taxing at the maximum rate; rather, the claim is unripe because the appellants have failed to demonstrate that they are forced to set their rates of tax at the maximum allowable rate just to provide an accredited education. That is, the districts have not pleaded that they have lost all meaningful discretion in setting the rate of tax as it pertains to their ability to meet a state-imposed obligation, which is the only relevant concern in this lawsuit. (95)

We granted the plaintiffs' petition for review and expedited oral argument. (96)

III

We consider first what the plaintiffs must allege to state a violation of article VIII, section 1-e, and then whether the plaintiffs can and do make that allegation.

A

We adhere to the rule stated in Edgewood III that "[a]n ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed directly by the State or when the State so completely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either directly or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful discretion." (97) The determining factor is the extent of the State's control over the taxation process.

The State argues that local school district property taxes cannot be a state tax unless every district is forced to tax at a specific rate, here, the maximum $1.50 rate for maintenance and operation (subject to adjustments). The trial court rejected this argument but held that there can be no state tax unless most districts are forced to tax at maximum rates. Both positions presuppose that the issue is the extent of the tax and that the determination must be made from the perspective of the system as a whole rather than with respect to each district. As the trial court stated: "Whether the Legislature has imposed a state ad valorem tax is decided by reference to how the public school finance system works throughout the state, not by reference to how the system works in any one district." This premise has no support in the constitutional text or the rule we have stated for applying it. The Constitution prohibits "State ad valorem taxes . . . upon any property within this State" (emphasis added) and is not limited to statewide ad valorem taxes. The provision expressly contemplates that a state ad valorem tax could be levied on only some property. The prohibition does not permit the State to set rates for hospital districts, or junior college districts, or mosquito control districts, or fire prevention districts, or noxious weed control districts -- to name but a few of the many taxing authorities (98) -- just because such districts are confined to a few areas of the State, nor does the Constitution permit the State to control the tax rate for even one such district. Were it otherwise, then as we observed in Edgewood III:

The State could create County Highway Districts, or County Prison Districts, or all-purpose County Funding Districts to levy taxes at set rates for prescribed purposes, and by such means accomplish what it could not do itself. (99)

The concern is not the pervasiveness of the tax but the State's control of it. A state ad valorem tax is just that -- one imposed by the State, whether it acts directly or through control of another entity, and whether the tax falls on the entire population or only a few.

Thus, a single district states a claim under article VIII, section 1-e if it alleges that it is constrained by the State to tax at a particular rate. How a constitutional violation in one or a few school districts would impact the public school finance system as a whole is not before us.

B

The State argues that for four reasons the plaintiffs cannot allege that they are forced to tax at maximum rates. To sustain the dismissal of the plaintiffs' case on the pleadings, however, the State must establish the plaintiffs' inability to plead a constitutional violation as a matter of law. (100) We examine each of the State's reasons in turn.

1

The State asserts that it exerts no control over taxation by local school districts and that the districts are free to tax at any levels they choose up to the maximum. The State's argument runs as follows. The duty to provide an adequate public education belongs to the Legislature, not local school districts. School districts are "forced" to do nothing; they choose to tax and educate at desired levels. While the State may encourage certain choices, it does not compel them.

This argument, in essence, is that nothing short of virtually absolute state control of ad valorem taxation violates article VIII, section 1-e. We plainly rejected the argument in Edgewood III:

How far the State can go toward encouraging a local taxing authority to levy an ad valorem tax before the tax becomes a state tax is difficult to delineate. Clearly, if the State merely authorized a tax but left the decision whether to levy it entirely up to local authorities, to be approved by the voters if necessary, then the tax would not be a state tax. The local authority could freely choose whether to levy the tax or not. To the other extreme, if the State mandates the levy of a tax at a set rate and prescribes the distribution of the proceeds, the tax is a state tax, irrespective of whether the State acts in its own behalf or through an intermediary. Between these two extremes lies a spectrum of other possibilities. If the State required local authorities to levy an ad valorem tax but allowed them discretion on setting the rate and disbursing the proceeds, the State's conduct might not violate article VIII, section 1-e. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define for every conceivable hypothetical precisely where along this continuum such taxes become state taxes. (101)

Certainly, the State does not now control taxation by school districts to the same extent it controlled taxation by the CEDs. But as we have said, the constitutional prohibition is violated whenever state control denies a taxing authority "meaningful discretion". (102)

The Legislature has deprived school districts of any meaningful discretion to provide an inadequate education, as indeed it is constitutionally bound to do. The Legislature's duty under article VII, section 1 is to make suitable provision for a general diffusion of knowledge through free public schools. "As long as the Legislature establishes a suitable regime that provides for a general diffusion of knowledge, the Legislature may decide whether the regime should be administered by a state agency, by the districts themselves, or by any other means." (103) "Certainly, if the Legislature substantially defaulted on its responsibility such that Texas school children were denied access to that education needed to participate fully in the social, economic, and educational opportunities available in Texas, the 'suitable provision' clause [of article VII, section 1] would be violated." (104) "In Edgewood I, we reaffirmed that the requirement of suitability is a judicially-enforceable mandate . . . ." (105) A public school system dependent on local districts free to choose not to provide an adequate education would in no way be suitable. In fact, the Legislature has acted to ensure that that is not the system. Chapter 39 of the Education Code, entitled "Public School System Accountability", sets school accreditation standards, (106) rewards achievement of these standards, (107) and imposes sanctions for non-compliance ranging from admonitions to closure of the district. (108) These provisions are legislated requirements that school districts provide an adequate education, and they leave no meaningful discretion for districts to do otherwise.

We also rejected the position for which the State now argues in Edgewood IV, expressly recognizing that school districts could indeed be "forced" -- our word -- by increasing costs "to tax at the maximum allowable rate just to provide a general diffusion of knowledge." (109) The "ceiling", we said, could become a "floor" as well, in which event "the conclusion that the Legislature had set a statewide ad valorem tax would appear to be unavoidable because the districts would then have lost all meaningful discretion in setting the tax rate." (110) The State successfully argued to the trial court that these statements were dicta, (111) but they were an important part of our rationale. (112) We held in Edgewood IV that local ad valorem taxes were not state ad valorem taxes because of then-existing circumstances that allowed school districts meaningful discretion in setting tax rates, and we expressly acknowledged that those circumstances could, and probably would, change. That distinction defined the reach of the Court's decision in the case. Had we thought that local school district property taxes could never violate article VIII, section 1-e, our decision would certainly have been far easier.

We remain of the view that school districts can be forced by the current system to tax at maximum rates. An allegation that this has occurred states a claim under article VIII, section 1-e.

2

Alternatively, the State argues that its only requirement of school districts is that they provide an accredited education as defined by the Legislature, and that the plaintiffs cannot allege in good faith that any district is forced to tax at the maximum rate just to meet this requirement. On the contrary, the State says, school districts taxing at maximum rates do so to provide enhanced educational opportunities and not merely to maintain accreditation. The court of appeals appears to have agreed with this argument.

Again, the State's argument suffers a flawed premise. Accreditation standards are not the only requirements the State imposes on school districts. As we have just explained, because the State has chosen to rely heavily on school districts to discharge its duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education -- that is, "[a] general diffusion of knowledge . . . essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people" (113) -- the State must require that school districts achieve this goal; otherwise, the public school system is not suitable for its purpose. Consistent with its constitutional duty, the Legislature has stated:

The mission of the public education system of this state is to ensure that all Texas children have access to a quality education that enables them to achieve their potential and fully participate now and in the future in the social, economic, and educational opportunities of our state and nation. That mission is grounded on the conviction that a general diffusion of knowledge is essential for the welfare of this state and for the preservation of the liberties and rights of citizens. (114)

We acknowledged in Edgewood IV that the Legislature in 1993 equated an accredited education with a general diffusion of knowledge and discharged its duty to provide for the latter by demanding accountability of school districts. (115) But we also insisted that the "State's provision for a general diffusion of knowledge must reflect changing times, needs, and public expectations", (116) and that the Legislature is not the sole arbiter of the constitutional standard. (117) The public school system the Legislature has established requires that school districts provide both an accredited education and a general diffusion of knowledge. It may well be that the requirements are identical; indeed, as in Edgewood IV, we presume they are, giving deference to the Legislature's choices. But it is possible for them not to be -- an accredited education may provide more than a general diffusion of knowledge, or vice versa -- and because both are binding, a district may allege that taxation at a maximum rate in order to satisfy either is a state ad valorem tax.

The court of appeals concluded that to "involve the courts in deciding what is meant by the term 'general diffusion of knowledge' without reference to the accreditation standards set by the Legislature" would "engage the judiciary in a debate over policy choices that are within the province of the legislative branch." (118) We agree, as we have already explained, that it is outside the scope of judicial authority to review the Legislature's policy choices in determining what constitutes an adequate education, and we emphasize that the courts cannot undertake to review those choices one by one or attempt to define in detail an adequate education. But once policy choices have been made by the Legislature, it is the judiciary's responsibility in a proper case to determine whether those choices as a whole meet the standard set by the people in article VII, section 1.

Even if the plaintiffs' claims were limited to taxing to provide an accredited education, there is no factual record for determining what the cost of an accredited education is. The plaintiffs urged in the trial court that they were entitled to discover the State's evaluation of that cost and to present evidence that the true cost is greater. For the trial court, this factual dispute was irrelevant, given its view that the plaintiffs could not allege a constitutional violation because they could not allege that half or close to half of all school districts were taxing at maximum rates. But since we have concluded, as the court of appeals did, that the number of districts taxing at maximum rates is not determinative of the plaintiffs' claims, the subsisting dispute over the cost of an accredited education precludes dismissal of the case on the pleadings.

Thus, to obtain dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims on the merits based solely on the pleadings, the State must establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff school districts are not forced to tax at maximum rates either to meet accreditation standards or to provide a general diffusion of knowledge. The State has done neither.

3

The Legislature has granted a partial homestead exemption from school district taxation, (119) which a district may increase up to a certain amount at its option, (120) as many districts do. The State argues that no school district that has opted for an increased homestead exemption can allege that it is forced to tax at maximum rates because it has meaningful discretion to deny the increased exemption and tax at a lower rate. The trial court agreed with this argument, and the court of appeals did not address it.

We reiterate that to obtain dismissal of the plaintiffs' action based solely on the pleadings, the State must establish that the mere existence of local-option exemptions precludes as a matter of law the allegation that school districts are forced to tax at maximum rates. The State has not met this burden. For one thing, the plaintiffs may be able to show that even without granting additional homestead exemptions, they could not provide an accredited education or a general diffusion of knowledge. For another thing, while school districts obviously have discretion whether to increase homestead exemptions, it is far from obvious that their discretion is meaningful. By authorizing local-option homestead exemptions, knowing that some constituencies will insist on them, the Legislature may actually have increased the pressure on school districts to tax at maximum rates. In any event, the plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to show that homestead exemptions do not afford them meaningful discretion.

4

Finally, the State argues that the plaintiffs cannot allege a violation of article VIII, section 1-e unless they tax at the applicable absolute maximum rate, not merely near that rate, as apparently only two of the four plaintiffs do. This is simply not the case. The constitutional issue remains the extent of the State's control. It may be that a school district taxing at $1.47 instead of $1.50 has exercised meaningful discretion, but that is not necessarily the case. A district taxing a few cents below the maximum rate that can no longer provide an accredited education or a general diffusion of knowledge even by raising the rate to the maximum need not do so just to prove the point.

C

The last matter is whether the plaintiffs did plead what they must to allege a violation of article VIII, section 1-e. The plaintiffs alleged that they were required to tax at maximum rates "to educate their students". In response to special exceptions, the plaintiffs stated that their allegation was tantamount to pleading that taxing at maximum rates was necessary to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge. When asked by the trial court whether the plaintiffs were pleading that they could not provide an accredited education or a general diffusion of knowledge at maximum rates, counsel responded, "All of the above." The plaintiffs repeatedly stated that they were pleading that the situation we foresaw in Edgewood IV would violate article VIII, section 1-e had in fact occurred. No reasonable argument can be made that the plaintiffs' pleadings did not put the State on notice of their claims. Of course, on special exceptions the trial court has discretion to further clarify the issues to be litigated by requiring the plaintiffs to allege specifically, for example, whether they are taxing at maximum rates to provide an accredited education, or to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge, or both, and whether the costs are different.

III

We add a few words in response to the dissent.

First: The dissent would hold that plaintiffs lack standing to sue. While "standing, as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived" (121) and may thus be raised at any time, the fact that the State has not challenged the plaintiffs' standing to sue, nor was the standing of any school district challenged in Edgewood I, Edgewood II, Edgewood III, or Edgewood IV, is some indication of the weakness of the dissent's argument. In Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, we held that a county appraisal district had standing to seek a declaratory judgment that the Legislature had unconstitutionally defined open-space land for tax purposes to include ecological laboratories. (122) We see no difference in the standing of an appraisal district to assert its claims in Nootsie and the standing of the school districts here. The dissent argues that Nootsie is at odds with federal standing jurisprudence, but even if it were -- something we need not decide here -- the dissent does not explain why any difference between Texas law and federal law is reason enough for us not to follow our own recent precedent. The dissent also argues that because the plaintiff school districts do not have and do not claim to have a constitutional right to meaningful discretion, they have no standing to seek a determination that taxation at maximum rates is a constitutionally prohibited state ad valorem tax. Again conceding the premise solely for argument purposes, we fail to see how the declaration the school districts request in this case is any different from the one the appraisal district requested in Nootsie. As we explained in Nootsie, the argument that

the district has no inherent vested rights protected by the Constitutions of Texas and the United States . . . misses the mark because the district does not contend that the statute violates constitutional rights belonging to the district. Instead, the district asserts an interest because it is charged with implementing a statute that it believes violates the Texas Constitution. This interest provides the district with a sufficient stake in this controversy . . . that the declaration sought will resolve. (123)

Finally, the dissent argues that Nootsie can be distinguished because there the appraisal district represented aligned interests while here the plaintiff school districts represent disparate and conflicting interests. We do not understand this distinction. Nootsie allowed an appraisal district to challenge the constitutionality of a tax exemption that at least one of its taxpayers, Nootsie, Ltd., claimed and others may have opposed. We fail to see how the interests of the taxpayers and citizens in the appraisal district in Nootsie were any less at odds than the interests of the taxpayers and citizens in the plaintiff school districts are here. For the same reasons we explained in Nootsie, we hold that the plaintiff school districts in this case have standing to assert their claims.

Second: Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we do not hold that school districts have a constitutional duty to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge. The districts' obligation is imposed by the Legislature, not the Constitution, as the passage of our opinion to which the dissent refers expressly states -- "[t]he public school system the Legislature has established requires that school districts provide both an accredited education and a general diffusion of knowledge" (emphasis added) -- and we repeat elsewhere and now again here. The Legislature has expressly defined the mission of the public school system, including school districts, to accomplish a general diffusion of knowledge. (124) As we have explained, the Legislature has chosen to make suitable provision for a general diffusion of knowledge by using school districts, and therefore the State cannot be heard to argue that school districts are free to choose not to achieve that goal. If they were, the Legislature's use of districts to discharge its constitutional duty would not be suitable, since the Legislature would have employed a means that need not achieve its end.

Third: The dissent would hold, contrary to Edgewood III and Edgewood IV, that a state ad valorem tax is a tax used for a state purpose rather than a tax levied by the State. We find nothing in the text or history of article VIII, section 1-e to require that a state tax be determined by its purpose rather than by the extent of state control over its employment. Nor are we clear how such a purpose-oriented standard would operate. In the dissent's view, any effort to equalize tax revenues among school districts for public education violates article VIII, section 1-e because education is a state purpose. This directly contradicts the Court's holdings in Edgewood III and Edgewood IV. We do not agree with the dissent that the importance of stare decisis can be minimized in this area. For fourteen years the Legislature has worked to bring the public school finance system into conformity with constitutional requirements as declared by this Court. To announce now that we have simply changed our minds on matters that have been crucial to the development of the public education system would not only threaten havoc to the system, but would, far more importantly, undermine the rule of law to which the Court is firmly pledged.

Fourth: The dissent argues that this Court's construction of article VII, section 1 since Edgewood I and perhaps dating back to Mumme v. Marrs (125) necessarily draws the judiciary into making detailed policy decisions about the elements of an adequate education. We reiterate that the Constitution requires, not that courts make such policy decisions, but that they determine, in a proper case, whether the Legislature on the whole has discharged its constitutional duty.

* * * * *

For these reasons, we conclude that the lower courts erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' action on the pleadings. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Nathan L. Hecht

Justice

Opinion delivered: May 29, 2003

1. Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1-e.

2. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992) [Edgewood III].

3. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 738 (Tex. 1995) [Edgewood IV].

4. Id.

5. 78 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002).

6. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) [Edgewood I]; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) [Edgewood II]; Edgewood III, supra note 2; Edgewood IV, supra note 3.

7. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1.

8. Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. 1931) ("Since the Legislature has the mandatory duty to make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools, and has the power to pass any law relative thereto, not prohibited by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it has a choice in the selection of methods by which the object of the organic law may be effectuated. The Legislature alone is to judge what means are necessary and appropriate for a purpose which the Constitution makes legitimate.").

9. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 498.

10. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 394; accord Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 736.

11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-178 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? . . . So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide the case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty."); Love v. Wilcox, 28 S.W.2d 515, 520 (Tex. 1930) ("Since Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166-167 (1803)], the courts of last resort of the several states have almost universally followed the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall to the effect that it is clear that: 'Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, . . . the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.'").

12. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 726 ("This Court's role under our Constitution's separation of powers provision should be one of restraint. We do not dictate to the Legislature how to discharge its duty. As prominent as this Court's role has been in recent years on this important issue, it is subsidiary to the constitutionally conferred role of the Legislature. The people of Texas have themselves set the standard for their schools. Our responsibility is to decide whether that standard has been satisfied, not to judge the wisdom of the policy choices of the Legislature, or to impose a different policy of our own choosing.").

13. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392; Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495; Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 496; Texas Legislative Budget Board, Financing Public Education in Texas Kindergarten Through Grade 12 Legislative Primer at 25-26 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter LBB Primer].

14. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495.

15. Id.

16. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392.

17. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495.

18. Act of June 2, 1969, 61st Leg., R.S., ch. 889, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2735, 2895-2896.

19. See Act of May 17, 1945, 49th Leg., R.S., ch. 304, § 1, 1945 Tex. Gen. Laws 488.

20. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 5(a) ("The principal of all bonds and other funds, and the principal arising from the sale of lands hereinbefore set apart to said school fund, shall be the permanent school fund, and all the interest derivable therefrom and the taxes herein authorized and levied shall be the available school fund. The available school fund shall be applied annually to the support of the free public schools.").

21. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495 n.10.

22. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392.

23. Id.

24. Id. ("Of total education costs, the state provides about forty-two percent, school districts provide about fifty percent, and the remainder comes from various other sources including federal funds."); see LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 1 ("For the 2000-01 biennium, state taxes are estimated to generate approximately 44 percent of the total funds and local school district property taxes 47.5 percent of the total. The federal government provides approximately 8.5 percent of the revenue, most of it earmarked for specific federal education programs.").

25. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392-393; LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 6 (stating, as of 2000: "There are 1,035 school districts in the state. The tax base among these districts varies considerably. Kenedy County Wide ISD has more than $3 million in property wealth per enrolled student, while Boles ISD has less than $10,000 in property wealth per enrolled student.").

26. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392; see LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 21 (stating, as of 2000: "The number of districts subject to the recapture provisions range from 85 to 100 in a given year. The associated recapture revenue is anticipated to total $949.8 million in the 2000-01 biennium.").

27. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 392-393.

28. Id. at 395 (citations omitted).

29. Id. at 397.

30. Id. at 398.

31. Id. at 399; accord Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 493.

32. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 399.

33. Id. at 397.

34. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 495.

35. Id. at 496.

36. Id. at 495 n.11 ("The question of local enrichment continues to be controlled by this Court's opinion in Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397-98.").

37. Id. at 500 (emphasis in original) (citation and footnotes omitted).

38. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 492.

39. Id. at 498.

40. Id.

41. Id. at 500.

42. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).

43. Id. at 502-503.

44. Id. at 506; see Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) ("The Legislature shall be authorized to pass laws for the assessment and collection of taxes in all school districts and for the management and control of the public school or schools of such districts, whether such districts are composed of territory wholly within a county or in parts of two or more counties, and the Legislature may authorize an additional ad valorem tax to be levied and collected within all school districts for the further maintenance of public free schools, and for the erection and equipment of school buildings therein; provided that a majority of the qualified voters of the district voting at an election to be held for that purpose, shall approve the tax.").

45. Edgewood II, 826 sw2d at 522-523.

46. Tex. H.J. Res. 10, H.J. of Tex., 73rd Leg., R.S. 184 (1993).

47. Tex. S.J. Res. 7, 73rd Leg., R.S., 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 5560 (passed Senate 27-4 and House 102-43).

48. Votes on Proposed Amendments to the Texas Constitution 1875 - May, 1993, at 27, reprinted in [4] 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws (amendment submitted May 1, 1993, defeated 755,417 to 1,293,224); Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727.

49. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479 [hereinafter Chapter 347]; see Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727.

50. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727.

51. LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 2.

52. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting former Tex. Educ. Code § 16.002(b), Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1492, now Tex. Educ. Code § 42.002(b)(1)(A)); see LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 2.

53. Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1498 (codifying former Tex. Educ. Code § 16.101).

54. Tex. Educ. Code § 42.101.

55. LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 14-16.

56. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code § 16.254, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1509-1511); see LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 2.

57. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731 n.10 ("Based on the evidence at trial, the district court found that meeting accreditation standards, which is the legislatively defined level of efficiency that achieves a general diffusion of knowledge, requires about $3,500 per weighted student.").

58. See LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 2.

59. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 728 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code § 16.302, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1514).

60. Tex. Educ. Code § 42.302; see LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 16-17.

61. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 728 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code § 16.303, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1514); Tex. Educ. Code §§ 42.303, 45.003(d).

62. See LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 2, 19-20.

63. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 728 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code § 36.002, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1480); Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1479 (codifying former Tex. Educ. Code § 36.001); Tex. Educ. Code §§ 41.001-.002; LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 20-21.

64. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 728 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code § 36.002, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1480).

65. Tex. Educ. Code § 41.002; LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 21.

66. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 728 (citing former Tex. Educ. Code §§ 36.003-.004, Chapter 347, supra note 49, at 1480); Tex. Educ. Code §§ 41.003-.004 (requiring that a school district with excess wealth per student effectuate a reduction by one or more of the following: consolidation with another district, detachment of territory, purchase of average daily attendance credit, education of nonresident students, or tax base consolidation); LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 21.

67. LBB Primer, supra note 13, at 21.

68. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 729-730 (emphasis in original).

69. Id. at 730; accord id. at 731 ("The State's duty to provide districts with substantially equal access to revenue applies only to the provision of funding necessary for a general diffusion of knowledge.").

70. Id. at 730.

71. Id. at 730 n.8 (citation omitted).

72. Id. at 732 (emphasis in original).

73. Id. at 732 n.14; cf. Mumme v. Mars 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. 1931) ("The word 'suitable,' used in connection with the word 'provision' in this section of the Constitution, is an elastic term, depending upon the necessities of changing times or conditions, and clearly leaves to the Legislature the right to determine what is suitable, and its determination will not be reviewed by the courts if the act has a real relation to the subject and object of the Constitution." (citation omitted)).

74. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 731 (footnote omitted).

75. Id. at 738.

76. Id. at 726.

77. Id.

78. See Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2207; Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1071, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 4087; Act of May 30, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 396, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2471; Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1187, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2667.

79. Texas Legislative Budget Board, Financing Public Education in Texas Kindergarten Through Grade 12 Legislative Primer at 1 (3d ed. 2001).

80. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 725.

81. West Orange-Cove Consolidated I.S.D., Coppell I.S.D., La Porte I.S.D., and Port Neches-Groves I.S.D.

82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

83. Felipe Alanis, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of Education; Texas Education Agency; Carol Keeton Strayhorn, in her official capacity as Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts; and Texas State Board of Education.

84. Edgewood I.S.D., Ysleta I.S.D., Laredo I.S.D., San Elizario I.S.D., Soccorro I.S.D., and South San Antonio I.S.D.

85. Alvarado I.S.D., Anthony I.S.D., Aubrey I.S.D., Bangs I.S.D., Bells I.S.D., Community I.S.D., Cooper I.S.D., Covington I.S.D., Detroit I.S.D., Early I.S.D., Fannindel I.S.D., Hutto I.S.D., Karnes City I.S.D., Kaufman I.S.D., Kirbyville I.S.D., Krum I.S.D., La Joya I.S.D., Mercedes I.S.D., Meridian I.S.D., New Boston I.S.D., Nocona I.S.D., Olfen I.S.D., Orange Grove I.S.D., Poteet I.S.D., Robinson I.S.D., Rosebud-Lott I.S.D., Rusk I.S.D., Southside I.S.D., Tornillo I.S.D., Trenton I.S.D., Tulia I.S.D., Uvalde I.S.D., Venus I.S.D., and Weaterford I.S.D.

86. The trial court stated in its order: "The changed-circumstances warning in Edgewood IV appears to be obiter dictum. Should the Supreme Court consider the present case, this court respectfully urges a reconsideration of this dictum. For the reasons cited, the court has concerns about the historical and analytical foundations of this dictum. Of course, dictum or not, the court today has faithfully followed the teachings of the Supreme Court, heeded the changed-circumstances warning, and applied the meaningful-discretion test."

87. 78 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002).

88. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).

89. Id.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 539.

92. Id.

93. Id. at 540 (emphasis in original).

94. Id.

95. Id. at 542.

96. 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 426, 428 (Feb. 13, 2003).

97. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502.

98. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(12).

99. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 501.

100. See Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998).

101. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502-503.

102. Id. at 502.

103. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 730 n.8.

104. Id. at 736.

105. Id. at 735.

106. Tex. Educ. Code § 39.072.

107. Id. §§ 39.091-.112.

108. Id. § 39.131; see Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 729 ("Districts that chronically fail to maintain accreditation standards are subject to penalties, including dissolution of the offending school district and its annexation to another district.").

109. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 738.

110. Id.

111. See note 86 supra.

112. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) ("'Although technically dicta, . . . an important part of the Court's rationale for the result it reache[s] . . . is entitled to greater weight . . . .'" (quoting Sheet Metal Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 478 U.S. 421, 490 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).

113. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1.

114. Tex. Educ. Code § 4.001(a).

115. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 730 ("In Senate Bill 7, the Legislature equates the provision of a 'general diffusion of knowledge' with the provision of an accredited education. The accountability regime set forth in Chapter 35, we conclude, meets the Legislature's constitutional obligation to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge statewide.").

116. Id. at 732 n.14.

117. Id. at 730 n.8 ("This is not to say that the Legislature may define what constitutes a general diffusion of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to make suitable provision imposed by article VII, section 1. While the Legislature certainly has broad discretion to make the myriad policy decisions concerning education, that discretion is not without bounds.").

118. 78 S.W.3d 529, 540 (Tex. App.--Austin 2002).

119. Tex. Tax Code § 11.13(b)-(c).

120. Id. § 11.13(d)-(f), (n).

121. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445-446 (Tex. 1993).

122. 925 S.W.2d 659, 661-662 (Tex. 1996) (citing Robbins v. Limestone County, 268 S.W. 915, 917 (1925) (holding that county and road districts can sue the state highway commission on the ground of the invalidity of statutes)).

123. Id. at 662 (citations omitted).

124. Tex. Educ. Code § 4.001(a).

125. 40 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex. 1931) ("The legislative determination of the methods, restrictions, and regulations is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen.").

Labels: CCISD, Educated

Friday, August 3, 2007

Fact Sheet - The School-to-Prison Pipeline in the National Context

Fact Sheet - The School-to-Prison Pipeline in the National Context

Home : Criminal Justice : Juvenile Justice
Fact Sheet - The School-to-Prison Pipeline in the National Context

* The "school-to-prison pipeline" describes an alarming trend wherein public elementary, middle and high schools are pushing youth out of classrooms and into the juvenile justice and criminal justice system.
o Under the banner of "zero tolerance," schools increasingly are relying on inappropriately harsh discipline and, increasingly, law enforcement, to address trivial schoolyard offenses among even the youngest students.
o Children are far more likely to be arrested at school than they were a generation ago. And these school-arrests are not for violent behavior. For example, in one Texas school district, 17 percent of school arrests were for disruptive behavior, and 26 percent were for disorderly conduct.(1)
o Defenders of the pipeline cannot attribute the explosion of school-based arrests to an increase in school violence. On the contrary, empirical evidence shows that between 1992 and 2002, school violence actually dropped by about half.(2)
o Rather than nurturing and educating children perceived to pose a disciplinary problem, schools are turning to law enforcement to simply get rid of the child.
* Unfortunately, children of color and children with disabilities bear the brunt of these harsh trends.
o Nationally, minority students are suspended at rates of two to three times that of other students. They are also more likely to be subject to office referrals, corporal punishment, and expulsion.(3)
o Children of color also are more likely to be referred by their school to the juvenile justice system.(4)
o Minority students with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. African American students with disabilities are three times more likely to receive short-term suspensions than their white counterparts, and are more than four times as likely to end up in correctional facilities.(5)
* Native American students in particular suffer harms from the pipeline, even when they are not incarcerated because of school discipline
o Alienated by school policies, students may perform poorly academically. In 2003, the U.S. Commission for Civil Rights reported that Native American children score lower than any other racial/ethnic group in standardized test scores.(6)
o In addition, they are more likely to drop out of school. Only 51 percent of Native American students graduate high school nationally, as compared to 75 percent of Caucasian students.(7)

1 The Advancement Project, "Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track At-A-Glance," at 15, available at http://www.advancementproject.org//reports/FINALEOLrep.pdf. (March 2005)
2 Id. at 11.
3 Russ Skiba, "Zero Tolerance: The Assumptions and the Facts," 2 Indiana Youth Servs. Ass’n, Education Policy Briefs at 4 (2004)
4 "Education on Lockdown," supra n.1 , at 18.
5 Johanna Wald & Daniel Losen, "Defining and Redirecting a School-to-Prison Pipeline," Framing Paper for the School-toPrison Pipeline Research Conference (May 2003) (citing U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office of Special Education Programs, Data Analysis Systems (DANS)).
6 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, "A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet Needs in Indian Country," (July 2003)
7 Gary Orfield, et al., Losing Our Future: How Minority Youth are Being Left Behind By the Graduation Rate Crisis, (March 2004)

Labels: AGIF, CCPD, JETS, LULAC, Minors, Parents, Tagging

posted by dannoynted1 at 1:04 AM | 0 comments
Sunday, July 29, 2007
My man was tagged by~ just wearing a white t`shirt~Build a White Wall~ for all the world to see

Local
In city vs. taggers, Garcia park, pool latest victims

By Barbara Ramirez (Contact)
Originally published 12:00 a.m., July 24, 2007
Updated 04:08 a.m., July 24, 2007

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Before the paint dries in one place, taggers have moved to another, officials with the city's Streets and Solid Waste Services Department said Monday.

At least 80 percent of the 18 parks previously eradicated of graffiti earlier this year have been targeted again, said Lawrence Mikolajczyk, assistant director of Corpus Christi's Solid Waste Services.

"We wash it up and they come back three or four days later and tag it again," Mikolajczyk said. "It's a never-ending process."

The Dr. Hector P. Garcia Memorial Park on Greenwood was tagged this weekend. The gazebo and concrete slab of the pool and its building had been tagged. The cost of damage had not been calculated late Monday.

Last week, a Vietnam War memorial on Bloomington Street in Molina Veterans Park was tagged. The taggers used shoe polish to deface the marble slate, costing the city a minimum of $300 to clean, Mikolajczyk said. City crews also are working to clean the bayfront Selena statue, which also was vandalized last week.

Juvenile Enforcement Team Officer B. Teed said recent graffiti has come from several tagging crews.

As of last month, the police department knew of 32 tagging crews, with an estimated 100 members, Teed said. The tagging seems to be from rival crews, looking to outdo one another and claim domain, Teed added.

"Obviously it's going to be a never-ending process until some of these taggers get the message," Mikolajczyk said.

Contact Barbara Ramirez at 886-3792 or ramirezb@caller.com

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Post Your Comments

Posted by meaalmeida on July 24, 2007 at 5:21 a.m. (Suggest removal)

they deserve to be caned, and chop their hands off,and! no welfare!

Posted by thadaeus on July 24, 2007 at 6:45 a.m. (Suggest removal)

it's bad enough that money was spent on that pathetic statue of a mildly famous local celebrity - now the city has to spend money cleaning it up. I say take down the statue of the "great" Selena. It was erected solely as a symbol of and for the benefit of her father's money grubbing conquests. With the statue gone, the city wont have to worry about spending money cleaning a needless statue and they will be able to spend money on more worthwhile endeavors - like feeding the homeless.

Posted by whoop97 on July 24, 2007 at 7:45 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Those caught tagging should be publicly flogged then forced into 6-months of scrubbing graffiti off of city and private property with a toothbrush-sized wire brush and lye soap while at the same time wearing specially-made bright pink prison overalls. If they do it again, they should be taken to the marina for a proper keel hauling.

Posted by knoy on July 24, 2007 at 8:16 a.m. (Suggest removal)

How seriously can the city be taking this? They have one officer who oversees the tagging which occurs in our city. I've telephoned to report graffitti inside a rental home(which eliminates the suspects to three who reside there.....I'm still waiting for a return phone call from Officer Teed. He has to be overwhelmed. We now have wireless networking installed throughout the city and wireless internet cameras as low as $250.00(cost of clean up of Veteran's Memorial on Bloomington) we could simply review captured video of these people who find glory in destruction and pay them a visit around lunch time while they're sleeping.

Posted by rsanchez on July 24, 2007 at 8:33 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Hey Thadaeus, any relation to Strom Thurmond or David Duke? You should move to greener pastures, maybe where hillbillies kick it and pump Garth Brooks. That statue will bring in more praise and adoration to it than u have ever gotten in your consumer driven life. Whats pathetic is not the statue, it's the fact that you live in that "go no where town" and actually expect more from it and it's hypocritical "conservative "leaders. You probably voted for Bush and still back him and the war.

Posted by arodriguez on July 24, 2007 at 8:34 a.m. (Suggest removal)

I agree with whoop97 those kids need to be punished to the full extent. It is ugly and degrading for us as a society what these little punks are doing. The city needs to monitor the areas that are tagged the most with cameras and catch these kids. And when these kids are caught I also think the parents should pay a fine as well if they are under the age of 17. I have two teens and I wonder how these parents dont know where their children are in the middle of the night. I always check on my children and if I ever found one of them doing that I would definitely turn them in and then make them scrub every single sign or fence that has graffiti on it within our neighborhood.

Posted by sgran77482 on July 24, 2007 at 8:44 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Thadeus, you obviously were not a fan of Selena and not Hipanic. I live in the "great northwest" and you would never think she was revered here, but guess what she is well known here and her music still popular. Having witnessed the international news media response to her death at the police department, calls from Spain, England,and South American countries jammed the lines clammoring for informationon of her death.
The taggers who today are tagging her statue are not gang members or least the gang members of 1995 who practically worshipped Selena. I would imagine that generation of gang members would kill the taggers who defaced the statue. they used to allow signing her mesages on the pedestal, but the statue was untouchable.

Posted by jpr110902 on July 24, 2007 at 8:55 a.m. (Suggest removal)

What needs to be done is parents need to start being more assertive with their children. My husband goes to work at 4am in the morning and he sees young boys riding their bikes. He calls the non emergency number to report it because they are probably up to no good. My question is where are their parents? The parents of the young men and women (not all grafitti is done by minors) should pay for the cleaning because the should know what their children are up to. As, for the adults causing property damage they should clean it themselves and all the other graffiti that is done in our area. They need to get a life and a job !!!!!

Posted by corpusbeach2 on July 24, 2007 at 9:16 a.m. (Suggest removal)

I agree, in the end parents are responsible for this behavior. People in this town have children because it's the macho thing to do. These kids grow into their teen years feeling insignificant. They fail in school and wonder how they fit into this individualistic power struggle that this country promotes. Crime empowers these kids with little to no effort so that's the path they take.

Posted by lemosf on July 24, 2007 at 10:03 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Selena's statue on the bayfront was not erected by her father but by a generous Philanthropist. And guess what? He is of Caucasian origin. So get your facts straight.

Posted by josegutz on July 24, 2007 at 10:35 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Graffiti is Graffiti regardless of where it is, or what the target is...
It doesn't matter if it's a Quaker statue that got tagged!!
So this is news? Keep racism OUT of this! The guy just made a statement about selena doesn't mean he is a biggot or hillbilly. I myself am tired about hearing of Selena...SO Thadeus is not a fan. I am Not a fan myself, and I am of mexican descent. Not everyone that is latino is a fan you know. I was a fan in her early years with the Dinos and then her father tried to cash out. I lost interest when the radio started playing her music to the bone...Now I go nuts when I hear a Selena song, just tired of all the hoopla and overplay... Just quit with the stereotypes. let her Rest in Peace.

Posted by jpr110902 on July 24, 2007 at 10:49 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The bottom line is Corpus Christi can not be a sparkling city by the sea with such ugly display of trying to claim ownership of property. If the taggers would work and pay taxes then they would think twice before destroying the City's property. Shame on you taggers and eventually you will get caught!!!!

Posted by tjcox on July 24, 2007 at 11:29 a.m. (Suggest removal)

We live in a beautiful city, and one that has so much potential. I often agree that the people running this city do not want to change in a forward moving direction, they want to keep it status quo. This has much to do with everyone saying, blah blah there's nothing to do here blah blah. I agree! Which brings me to my point...

The taggers have nothing to do with how the city is run

(it's the fact that you live in that "go no where town" and actually expect more from it and it's hypocritical "conservative "leaders),

they are little criminals who are defacing private and public property because they haven't been taught the value of hard work and respecting the property of others. People should not be sterotyped, criminal behavior knows no race, it is what it is. These criminals should be charged and made to work off their debt first by scrubbing up the graffiti, and second by volunteering with less fortunate people.

Posted by fresacrema65 on July 24, 2007 at 12:34 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I don't want to criticize the police because I am sure there may be some reasonable explanation as to why the taggers are not being caught. But why not guard the areas that are being hit over and over again?
"We wash it up and they come back three or four days later and tag it again," Mikolajczyk said. "It's a never-ending process."

Is the pd trying to catch these taggers in the act - that is what I want to know.

Posted by jimd on July 24, 2007 at 12:46 p.m. (Suggest removal)

If I had to bet, 90% of the taggers are hispanic bangers.....as groups like LULAC, GI Forum, Hispanic Chamber of Commerce sit back and don't take a leading role in trying to install etiquette, consideration of other's property and just plain good ole wholesome values in their brown brothers. It's a cycle that will never be broken....kids breeding kids.

Need to set up a free vasectomy clinic for the 18 year old macho men who get their chulas pregnant and then take off only to repeat the act again.

Posted by racerrick22 on July 24, 2007 at 2:24 p.m. (Suggest removal)

JimD you hit the nail squarely on the head. Those groups do nothing but promote racism. It's been going on for thirty years or more. They are taught to poke the eyes of the white man starting at birth. Sad but true. Why? I don't know. This town is 70% hispanic yet all we here is how the hispanics are miss treated, blah, blah, blah. The song hasn't changed for three decades. If you want a real eye operner, go the the Social Security Office anytime of day and look around. You'd expect to see gray hair folks there yet all I see is young hispanics covered in gang tatoos, male and female, with several small kids running around terrorizing the other citizens. Why? Because when a gang member is shot or stabbed, the tax payers have to pay for them and there kids for the rest of there life because they aren't able to work. What a joke. That's why SS is going broke but, you never hear a word about it in the news. A great lie is being laid on the American people...is it ever going to stop? And you ask, where are the parents....smoking crack and teaching the kids all the bad stuff that we see in the streets of CC. It's terrible whats happened to Corpus Christi (the body of Christ) in the last 30 years. It hasn't always been this way as the old folks know. Very sad.

Posted by josegutz on July 24, 2007 at 2:28 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I agree with what jimd said. It's about time LULAC and GIFORUM got into this and spoke out to the public about the young hispanic population getting these (chulas) pregnant then NOT being responsible for their actions. They are bangers alright...Bang and leave...and bang again. More awareness is needed.

Posted by rhdj on July 24, 2007 at 3:04 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Does it really matter what race the taggers were.... No way! For years I heard about how the hispanic was treated like a second class citizen, I was young.. I said , nah this town is a hispanic majority, no way. Then I entered the work force and found out the hard way, it is true. Even with a college education I was treated badly. The stories I can tell you! The main problem is people make assumption based on race without even knowing the person. Think about it ..are hispanics the only ones that have the problems pointed out in the posts above, the answer is NO. My dad was in the GI forum, never did I here a racist word out of his mouth, but you assume the worst. My parents taught me respect for everyboby, yet you assume. I have been to the SS office with my mother several times, seems diverisity is alive and well there, you see want you want to see and ignore the big picture to fit your view. Odds are the taggers were hispanic, I do have eyes and see what is going on in this town. I disagree with the idea that hispanics are breed to hate. Do not let the action of a few define our hispanic population, the same can be done for everybody if you really wanted. It bothers me when thugs give hispanics a bad name, but it bothers me when the assumption is made we are all thugs. It bring tears to my eyes to read the hate in some of these posts. Why?!

Posted by rhdj on July 24, 2007 at 3:23 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Taggers disrespected everybody with their action. Everyboby should be be up in arms against them. The police can not do it alone, we need to get involved and watch our streets, this is happening in every part of town. If we work together, this can be stopped. The people in our block watch and listen for trouble and try to stop it if possible. It started with minor problems, but we got together and stopped before it was a major problem. We outnumber them(taggers) this can work.

Posted by josegutz on July 24, 2007 at 4:05 p.m. (Suggest removal)

rhdj,

No hate from me brother...We are all brothers here. Every man is a brother to another. I just think it's time to get along and work together.

Posted by kennymc69 on July 24, 2007 at 4:07 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Wow, I never knew racism was so strong in Corpus Christi. It doesnt matter what race these taggers are, the fact of the matter is, what they are doing is NOT ART!!! By population numbers hispanics definitely outnumber any race in our city, but to make racist remarks and say hispanic organizations should control their people is just dispicable. Its people like you that give this city a bad name. The hispanic population is strong in Corpus Christi, but not all hispanics are pregnant chulas, or gangbangers, and to suggest otherwise is disgusting. Why don't you take a look at yourself, and figure out what you can do to help with the problem. If you are not part of the solution, you are part of the problem.

Posted by josegutz on July 24, 2007 at 4:26 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Look around and see...It's sad.

too bad...can't do anything on my part but pray.

Posted by arthur6889 on July 24, 2007 at 5:30 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I am part of the tagger problem, yessiree, bobby, sure am. And, I'm staying that way.

Why? Because at one time I was surrounded by gang members called the "Ace of Spades". Left their mark all over the neighborhood.

Being a neighbor and being friendly, I endured myself to them.
I asked the father also a gang member (40 year old plus) what the point was for tagging. He wouldnt answer. I wanted him to talk.

Basically it's "their territory". To rob, steal, smoke dope, sell dope, protect their sisters, mothers and themselves. An Hispanic man had erected a long wooden fence. Next morning completely covered with their "messages".

A garage at the intersection of two streets tagged so often it probably has 20 coats of cover-up paint.

A friend told me when school lets out, they will sleep until noon, boredom will set it, then it starts breaking out., when school starts back up the hard core will be dodging the truant officers.

In my neighborhood they like empty houses to smoke blunts and plan.

The Selena statue was a gift to the citizens of Corpus Christi. Some people have contrary opinions about its location. And, depending on visual impressions what defines vandalism. When the statue first went up the city had to erect a barrier to protect the site from writing on the brick flooring and statue.

It must be some kind of human necessity to express grief by writing and disrespect for oneself by tagging.

When you sincerely ask them why they do the things they do, they have a similiar sincere response, "because that's the way we are".

Posted by ord2001mike on July 24, 2007 at 7:59 p.m. (Suggest removal)

taggers.... ??... is it really cool to call yourself a "tagger" now? how lame is that... what should really be done is a look into the life of a tagger.... then look at the older taggers and show the world what losers they really are, and maybe then, kids will see the light...

also, for those who don't like this city.... get the f**k out then... whats stopping you? this city could do with less of your crappy attitude...

Posted by jimd on July 24, 2007 at 9:04 p.m. (Suggest removal)

When tagging is considered cool, and LULAC does not take an active role against it, you best know it's time to get out, which I did. Mama didn't raise no fool.

Enjoy your "art", pander to your criminals.

Posted by natasofthedeepestpitofhell on July 24, 2007 at 10:12 p.m. (Suggest removal)

If only they had not shot the guy with the machete...

If we could have redrected his anger and machete toward the taggers our problems would be solved...somewhat.

Where is Karl Childers when you need him?

Posted by thadaeus on July 25, 2007 at 6:53 a.m. (Suggest removal)

1) no – im not related to Duke or Thurmond, and I HAVE moved to MUCH “greener” pastures…I was born and bred in Sparkling City by the Sea, but I currently reside in Washington DC. Question for you, though…what “praise” and “adulation” does the statue bring to CC? My conservatism has nothing to do with latinos who have nothing to hold them up other than the memory of a MILDLY famous celebrity. Let’s all just hope that Eva Longoria doesn’t bite the dust…if, God forbid, that ever happened, there would sightings of her likeness in tortillas all over South Texas for years to come. And yes – I DO support President Bush, and I DO back the war (Ive served in it twice so far). As a 14 year veteran STILL serving in our military, I PROUDLY support the war and our great President.

2) YES, I was a fan of Selena (albeit not a “huge” one), and I AM Latino. I danced many a night to her music at Hollywood Nights back in the ‘90s, and I had her first 2 CDs. I don’t deny Selena’s celebrity. But I don’t pretend it was greater than it was. Im sure the story caught the attention of international media – but im also sure it wasn’t as “huge” a story as you remember it being. I was HERE in the US – stationed in North Carolina, and I DISTINCTLY remember the story being a “news tidbit” on NC tv stations.

3) I admit – I’m uneducated as to the origins of the statue – and the ethnic persuasion of said philanthropist is irrelevant. The fact still remains – Selenas father exploits her existence. The fact still remains – were it not for the movie on her life, she would have faded away into obscurity. The fact remains - the city is SPENDING MONEY cleaning up graffiti on that statue…and the fact still remains – that is money that could be better spent by the city.

Posted by jimd on July 25, 2007 at 8:07 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The graffiti is bad enough, but one of the most despicable acts is when Selena's adorers steal flowers from others graves at Seaside Memorial to place on her grave. What scum, what disrespect! This (inconsiderate) culture has no respect for others' property or feelings.

Posted by thadaeus on July 25, 2007 at 8:09 a.m. (Suggest removal)

LOL at selena addorers stealing flowers from other graves at Seaside Memorial park to place on her grave.

Posted by narc on July 25, 2007 at 8:45 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Isn't the term hispanic or latino referring to ethnicity and not race? Is there a hispanic race, and if so, who is winning?

Posted by arthur6889 on July 25, 2007 at 9:31 a.m. (Suggest removal)

narc: now that's interesting enough to respond to.

In my opinion there is no such thing as a Latino. I'm not even sure Hispanic is correct.

At one time in human history there was a thing called the Roman Empire that spread its influence like any good Empire.

It seems to me they spoke a language called LATIN, I might be wrong?

From them came the so-called ROMANance languages. As I barely remember, I think they were SPANISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, and ROMANian.

Sometime or another the ROMAN Catholic Church started and began their own religious influence.

Along comes somebody named Columbus a ROMANance language speaker who heads out over the deep blue sea to parts unknown. He "finds/discovers" a virgin country already "found" a hundred times before.

His second or third trip he is accompanied by Catholic priests who condon stealing anybody's gold because after all he's not paying for the voyage. Queen Isabella is. And, also condoned is the burning of "savages" accumulations of mother-earth knowledge and understandings.

So, these ROMANance languages priests began teaching the savages a ritual called, "Holy Mass", spoken not in savagery but a new language for them called, LATIN.

Well, time went on and the Catholic religion grew in leaps and bounds. After a while this "virgin" land who had never been discovered was called, "LATIN AMERICA".

Then to add insult to injury. Christopher Columbus began calling the savages "Indio". And, from that day forward all the savages in South and North America were called "Indians" , because he thought they were from the continent INDIA.

Ask an old timer "savage/indian" what he is and he will say, not indian and certainly not savage, but something like Apache, or Dakota, or flat-nose, or Nez-Pierce or something like that. What does Eskimo mean? PEOPLE.

And, what happened to ROMANance speaker Columbo? They got mad at him and when died they buried him in an unmarked grave, until it was time to be cool and erect a statue for him

I really don't thing any HISPANIC or LATINO can speak low, middle or high LATIN. Well, maybe some Catholic Priest at high and Holy Mass.

Posted by jimd on July 26, 2007 at 8:27 a.m.

(This comment was removed by the site staff.)

Posted by josegutz on July 26, 2007 at 8:45 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Who's laughing now? Hmm? Not all are chulas but a HECK of a lot (majority) are...

http://www.caller.com/news/2007/jul/25/t...

And sadly the highest rate is among latinas, which is what was all over the news these past few days.

So this is why we fail...because of irresponsible mentality and denial of failure. Keep it up and see where this society takes you.

I know we all have choices and we all start by raising our children responsibly.

Posted by louie_8201 on July 26, 2007 at 12:29 p.m. (Suggest removal)

thadaeus and the rest of you HATERS no one cares about your racial comments. Keep your pie hole shut and deal with LIFE. If unhappy do us ALL a favor and crawl back under the rock you came from. Blah, blah, blah.

Posted by louie_8201 on July 26, 2007 at 12:31 p.m. (Suggest removal)

thadaeus what a pathetic name.

Posted by changemost256 on July 26, 2007 at 12:45 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Why is this city so whack w/ art ideas for the youth in your city??
Why cant this city be more like San Antonio and support local artist?

Build something that allows local artist to show there creativity and exression, "real artist"!!! I'm not talking about the kid who just created his/her first throw-up last week!!!! I'm talking about the real dedicated artist out there who have been doing this for a decade+ now, it would really be good for the city to support the youth down there as opposed to what ya'll are doing to them by locking them up for a weekend until Mom or Dad gets a hold of them. A program will bring a lot of the youth together plus if it starts around the city again "in an illegal manner" well all the cops would have to do is go to the "local artist spot provided by the city" and find the same artist name there and bam, you will have your suspect. Simple!

-proud artist

LOVE ART NOT HATE!

Posted by craney106 on July 26, 2007 at 6:51 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Officer B. Teed said he knows of 32 tagging crews with 100 members. Well, the job is not finished is it ? I am not a cop, but I think next comes 100 warrents. Then Judge, Your Honer, sir..I suggest 200 hours community service for each tagger and no more than 30 days to do the time. This tagging could be under control with-in a week. By the way, one officer? Gee, why can"t the others help???

Posted by arthur6889 on July 26, 2007 at 7:57 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I'm not naming which HEB (we are talking about art?), but there is a young Hispanic girl who is absolutely and stunningly beautiful.

I saw her today, just glanced, didnt want to stare, and thought, OMG what art is this?

They move her around the store, so she disappears for a time. The face of pure innocence. It almost like you want to fall into her and love her soul.

Posted by baircub on July 27, 2007 at 10:56 p.m. (Suggest removal)

changemost256, uhm, not that I'm against art, but I don't consider graffiti and tagging art. I call it vandalism. which is a crime. This is not about supporting art, or not supporting art....this is about going after thugs and criminals...and I don't care what their race, ethnicity, or background, or socioeconomic status is. I don't care if they're misunderstood youth, or angry youth, or troubled youth. They committed a crime, and we need to stop it. There is nothing racist about it. if the taggers were white, or asian, or whatever, I'd say the same thing to them as I would to anyone else. "You do the crime, you pay the consequences." No second chances, no leniency. no slap on the wrist. No, you commit vandalism, you don't get probation, where all that happens is that you get a stern talking to by a judge. Nor should you even go to a juvenile detention facility to sit on your butt and feel sorry for yourself. I don't care if you're some stupid runt of a 14 year old, or even a 12 year old, or a 26 year old, or whatever the age. Here's what you get. You get to face the people who's property you damaged. You get to face the music, and yeah, even have your name published in the paper, along with your photograph even. Maybe a little humiliation would be good for you. Then you get to go out, and pay off your debt to society by cleaning up not only the mess you made, but what other thug brats like yourself have committed. Get hot, get sweat soaked, get sore and exhausted doing a lot of hard work. I hope your arms are sore, and your back aches, and your head pounds. Because that's what the property owners have to put up with cleaning after the mess you brats have made. And these gangbanger thugs talk about how they demand respect...they deserve no respect at all, until they've EARNED respect HONORABLY! And that's by being a good and decent citizen, not some stupid punk thug.

Posted by dannoynted1 on July 29, 2007 at 2:52 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Why don't y'all build a WALL for them ?

Posted by dannoynted1 on July 29, 2007 at 3:11 a.m. (Suggest removal)

U could call it the taggers wall of fame or frame.

Posted by dannoynted1 on July 29, 2007 at 3:21 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Jimd and ricko are bred to hate......they are the problem with "workforce/source" issues.

They hate because it is the "macho" thing to do where they come from and I would be surprised if they even have kids.

This is the reason they want to throw away education.

I especially believe they do not care about anyone in the Body of Christ except themselves.

Labels: AGIF, CCPD, JETS, LULAC, Minors, Parents, Tagging

posted by dannoynted1 at 1:31 AM | 1 comments
Saturday, May 12, 2007
Civics Failure in Public Education

March 02, 2007
Civics Failure in Public Education

Paul Soglin:

While everyone is weighing in on the best way to teach our kids, I cannot get over the failure to educate youngsters about American institutions.

The more inclusive and more truthful curriculum about our nation's history that is taught today is a vast step forward. However, when I graduated from high school I could discuss the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the the Declaration of Independence and their inherent contradictions. I knew the three branches of government and their powers.

There are some teachers who emphasize civics. A great teacher friend recently mentioned "if we're doing such a good job with the students, why are so few people asking questions of our government?" Posted by Jim Zellmer at March 2, 2007 05:17 AM
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posted by dannoynted1 at 12:14 AM | 0 comments
Friday, April 06, 2007

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Scott Elliff among CCISD final four candidates

By adriana garza Caller-Times
April 6, 2007

CCISD trustees will consider at least one local candidate when they resume discussion about superintendent candidates at their Monday meeting.

Corpus Christi Independent School District's Acting Superintendent Scott Elliff confirmed Thursday that he was one of four candidates for the job and that board members interviewed him in closed session Wednesday.

The board has disclosed neither the names nor the home districts of the remaining candidates.

According to state law, school boards are not required to reveal the names of candidates until they are designated finalists. The law does not define what makes a candidate a finalist.

According to an agenda released Thursday, board members are expected to discuss their notes and thoughts from the interviews in closed session, which could begin as early as the board's budget workshop at 3 p.m. if time permits, said Board President Louis Garza.

Also on the agenda is the discussion and possible action regarding finalist or finalists for position of superintendent.

"I am hopeful we will come up with some facsimile of a finalist or finalists," Garza said.

Trustee John Longoria said that he is sure some type of action will be taken, adding that board members won't know who the finalists may be until all members discuss scores given to each candidate.

During a series of public meetings where board members received community input for the superintendent profile, dozens of community members expressed support for Elliff, who has served as acting superintendent since August.

More than half of the approximately 900 people who responded to an on-line survey about the superintendent profile earlier this year indicated they favored a local candidate for the job.

Contact Adriana Garza at 886-3618 or HYPERLINK mailto:garzaa@caller.com garzaa@caller.com

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Bring CCISD selection process into light of day

The secrecy surrounding the current search for a new superintendent is indefensible. Did we learn nothing from the previous fiasco?

April 6, 2007

The selection process that will ultimately produce a finalist for superintendent of the Corpus Christi Independent School District is up and running.

On Wednesday the trustees interviewed four candidates for the post - including Scott Elliff, interim superintendent since the resignation of Jesus Chavez in February 2006.

That much we know of a certainty. It also seems safe to assume that the four individuals in question could fairly be considered the finalists from the field of 25 applicants who were being considered for the position.

However, should we at this late date be dealing in "seems" and "assume" when it comes to the process that will determine who is to lead the city's largest school district?

The question arises: Why has the Board of Trustees gone to such lengths to keep the public from getting anything more than a fleeting glimpse of the action? After all, the previous superinten-dent hunt, which saw Shoney Bria first accept, then decline the post, was grievously marred by the secrecy that surrounded it.

But - again - the board apparently believes that the releasing of names could prove ruinous for the applicants back in their home districts.

That, however, looks more and more like a smoke screen. School districts throughout the length and breadth of the nation are seeking leaders, and up-and-coming administrators are looking to move into superintendencies in larger districts.

The curtain of confidentiality is, at long last, nonsensical. More to the point, it does a disservice to the community. Consider: As matters now stand, we do not even know how many of the contenders will find favor with the trustees and be presented to the public. It could be one. Then again, it could be two, perhaps even three.

Concern for confidentiality is, or should be, trumped by another, vastly more important consideration: the public's right to know, and its right to have at least some role to play in the process.

The trustees' refusal to lay out the cards is beyond irritating; it borders on the outrageous.

Particularly disturbing is the fact that three new trustees elected last year - Carol Scott, John Longoria and Dwayne Hargis, all of whom emphasized their intent to bring new openness to the board - appear to have bought into the mum's-the-word ethos that has dominated this exercise.

To be sure, they (and their colleagues) could, and should, reverse their field - but the time remaining in which to keep this selection process from being grievously tainted is rapidly running out.

Editorial~4/6/2007

posted by dannoynted1 at 4:32 AM | 0 comments
Sunday, April 01, 2007
Tagged by Corpus Christi police, 2 teens were arrested at King High School

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Students arrested after cars tagged
March 31, 2007

Corpus Christi police arrested two 15-year-old boys Friday after several cars were spray painted on the 5000 block of Bevly Drive early Sunday, police said.

Residents on Bevly Drive near Janssen Drive woke up Sunday morning to find 11 cars tagged with blue spray paint that caused more than $2,000 in estimated damages, police Capt. David Cook said.

Police received an anonymous tip that keyed them toward two King High School students, Cook said. The teens were arrested at King High School on suspicion of criminal mischief, he said.

They remained in the Nueces County Juvenile Justice Center on Friday evening, police said.

- David Kassabian

Officials at the Corpus Christi Police Department provided this information. Numbered addresses refer to block numbers

posted by dannoynted1 at 2:09 AM | 0 comments
Tuesday, March 27, 2007
Carroll junior gives taggers the brushoff

posted by dannoynted1 at 2:23 AM | 0 comments
Ken Brunkenhoefer, 65, said police caught the taggers who had sprayed bicycle-sized symbols and vulgar words on his fence.

Click here to view a larger image.
Todd Yates/Caller-Times

Sarra Humpal, a 16-year-old junior at Carroll High School, sits in front of a 50-foot mural that she painted during spring break. The homeowner was fed up with looking at graffiti.
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Carroll junior gives taggers the brushoff

Sarra Humpal's 50-foot mural replaces graffiti

By Mike Baird Caller-Times
March 26, 2007

Thwarting graffiti turned out to be an artistic delight for Carroll High School's Sarra Phea Humpal - and she was paid $160 to do it. "I really hate graffiti," said Sarra, a junior and the school newspaper's graphic artist. "One spray ruins property, it's distasteful and ugly."

During spring break Sarra, a 6-foot 1-inch-tall 16-year-old, designed and painted a 50-foot mural over gang symbols on the back of a private-property privacy fence that faced the playground at Jones Elementary, her former school.

Property owner Ken Brunkenhoefer, 65, said police caught the taggers who had sprayed bicycle-sized symbols and vulgar words on his fence. "I had to do something with it, but smearing paint over it would stand out," said the insurance claims adjuster.

Brunkenhoefer said he "killed two birds," ridding his fence of graffiti and helping Sarra with money for her senior trip to Europe. He bought supplies - primary-colored paints that Sarra mixed into more than a dozen colors. Sarra said her height helped her paint the fence without a stool.

Brunkenhoefer is concerned that the painting could be tagged with graffiti, but said he is willing to have it repainted as necessary. He wished his next door neighbors would have their fences painted, too, so the children could enjoy them, even though his neighbors' fences haven't been tagged.

He, Sarra; her mother, Lissa Humpal; and a friend, Lauren Barker, began priming the defaced fence March 15.

"It snowballed," said Lissa Humpal, a teacher for 16 years. "The white base paint seeped through the wood and it was a lot of work brushing it thick enough into the course grooves of the wood." But Sarra remained steadfast, working daylong through Sunday when she put the final touches on 5-foot smiling flowers, butterflies and bunnies.

Many of the children and parents in his neighborhood have said they really enjoyed the painting, Brunkenhoefer said.

Onlookers appreciate the change Sarra brought to the playground. "Isn't it cool?" said Galen Hoffstadt, principal at the elementary. "I came in this weekend and went, 'Oh my gosh we have a new mural.' "

She learned Wednesday it was created by a former student.

"Sarra was always one of those great gals who believed when life gave you lemons, you should make lemonade," Hoffstadt said. "She turned that rudeness into beautiful art. What talent."

Hoffstadt e-mailed her colleagues after lunch.

"It looks like we have our own Mighty Marlin (the school's mascot) painter angel," Hoffstadt's e-mail to teachers and administrators read. "Let's say thank-you to Sarra for our delightful new view by helping her fund her trip." The principal told the faculty that an envelope for donations will be in her office until the end of the month.

The trip to London, Rome, Venice, Pompeii and Paris - all in three weeks next July - was worth having come back to school Monday with green, white and yellow acrylic paint highlights in her auburn hair, Sarra said.

"My friends were like, 'What's in your hair?' " Sarra said.

Her reply: "It's the European countryside."

Sarra always has been artistic, her mother said. While other children chalked sidewalks with hopscotch boxes, Sarra drew cartoon characters, Humpal said. "Sarra made ice-box drawings like all little kids," Humpal said, "but she didn't just color a blue house, it had three shades of blue." Sarra learned highlighting and shading skills as a sixth-grader at Grant Middle School, her mother said. "After that her drawings were always chosen for display at the art museum or the mall."

Sarra qualified last month for the state competition in the University Interscholastic League's Visual Arts Scholastic Event, coming up next month in Houston, said Tony Armadillo, her teacher in her advanced placement art design class.

Last year she won second place.

"Sarra is a great person," said Armadillo, an art teacher for 30 years, "who will bring great changes to any community."

Contact Mike Baird at 886-3774 or HYPERLINK mailto:bairdm@caller.com bairdm@caller.com

posted by dannoynted1 at 2:14 AM | 0 comments

Labels: CCISD, Educated

CCISD conduct consul

Monday, August 13, 2007

School funds are held to be trust funds for educational purposes. Such funds do not belong to the district or to the officers of the district,........

Friday, August 3, 2007

Fact Sheet - The School-to-Prison Pipeline in the National Context

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